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Abstrat
We onsider the problem of the manager of a storable ommodity (e.g. hydro,oal) portfolio faing
demand risk while having aess to storage failities and illiquid spot and forward markets. In this
setting, we emphasize that a dynamially onsistent way of managing risk over time must be introdued.
In partiular, we demonstrate the temporal inonsisteny of stati risk objetives based on nal wealth
and advoate the use of a new lass of reursive risk measures suh as those suggested by Epstein et al.
(1989) and Wang (2000) for portfolio optimization and valuation. This type of risk measures not only
provide time-onsistent deision plannings but allow the portfolio manager to ontrol independently the
ourrene of ash-ows aross time and aross random states of nature. We illustrate the disussion in an
empirial setion where the trade-o between nal wealth risk and bankrupty risk at an intermediate date
is analyzed and the synergy between the physial assets omposing a ommodity portfolio is assessed.

The authors thank Paul Kleindorfer and Stanley Zin for helpful omments. They also are grateful to Olivier Bardou,
Guillaume Leroy, David Game, and Jean-Jaques Ohana for useful suggestions.
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1 Introdution
We onsider the situation of a retailer, who is engaged in long-term sale ontrats, owns storage failities
and an trade the ommodity in illiquid spot and forward markets. The retailer is faing a portfolio
optimization problem, that translates into deiding at eah time step whih quantity to injet in or
withdraw from her storage failities and trade in the spot and forward market, and a portfolio valuation
problem, that onsists in assessing the value of the global portfolio and of eah asset omposing it. The
optimization and the valuation take plae in the ontext of two types of risk: the volume risk that arises
from the random demand of long-term ustomers and is related to exogenous non traded variables suh
as weather, and the prie risk that is linked to the volatility of the ommodity prie.
In this inomplete market setting, the value of the retailer's portfolio is not uniquely determined by
arbitrage onsiderations and an integrated portfolio approah is needed to handle liquidity onstraints.
The stohasti programming literature, on the one hand, has essentially treated situations where portfolio
management is analyzed through a mean-variane riterion applied to nal or intermediate wealths, and
fully dened at the rst deision date. In partiular, the risks arising at intermediate deision dates
are not taken into aount, leading to possible onits between deisions taken over time. Examples
of this approah are found in Unger (2002), where a CVaR onstraint on the nal wealth is addressed
through a Monte-Carlo approah, in Martinez-de-Albeniz et al. (2005), where mean-variane trade-os
are onsidered and yield expliit solutions in a one-step framework, and in Kleindorfer et al. (2004), where
the ase of a multi-period VaR onstraint on ash ows is examined.
The literature on deision theory, on the other hand, has paid a deserved attention to the problem of
dynami hoie under unertainty. Originally, it was the problem of dynami onsumption planning that
was analyzed by eonomists. In a seminal paper, Epstein et al. (1989) introdue a set of dynami utilities,
dened reursively in a disrete time setting, and allowing one to separately aount for the issue of
substitution -ontrolling onsumption over time- and risk aversion -ontrolling onsumption aross random
states of nature. In nane, dynami risk measures were reently introdued to aount for the ourrene
of a stream of random ash-ows over time. A general requirement for these risk measures is their time-
onsisteny (see e.g., Artzner et al. (2002)) beause, as emphasized by Wang (2000), multi-period risks
are reevaluated as new information beomes available, whih raises the issue of the ompatibility between
onseutive deisions implied by the risk measure.
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Our artile, to our knowledge, is the third attempt after Chen et al. (2004) and Eihhorn et al. (2005)
and to use dynami risk objetives in inventory and ontrats portfolio problems. Eihhorn et al. (2005)
use a restrition of the set of oherent dynami risk measures dened by Artzner et al. (2002) to solve
an eletriity portfolio optimization problem but do not raise the problem of time onsisteny of optimal
strategies. Chen et al. (2004) dene their objetive funtion as an additive intertemporal utility of the
onsumption proess of the portfolio manager. Instead, we hoose the Epstein et al. (1989) non additive
intertemporal utility objetive and apply it diretly to the ash ow proess. The impat of this hange
is signiant : in our setting, the initial wealth is not a state variable, the only state variables being the
inventory level, and the umulative positions in the forward market for eah future delivery period; in
addition, the retailer's problem appears as a ash-ow stream management one rather than a onsumption
planning one; lastly, the exibility of the non additive intertemporal utility allows the portfolio manager
to separately ontrol the distribution of ash ows aross time periods and aross states of nature, whih
is not allowed by an additive utility objetive on the onsumption proess
1
.
The ontribution of this paper is twofold: i) on the methodologial side, we dene the onept of time-
onsisteny of optimal strategies, show that the lassially used stati risk measures on nal wealth are
not time-onsistent and advoate the use of reursive utilities as a time-onsistent and exible measure for
portfolio risk management and valuation; ii) on the operational side, we provide a tratable framework to
dynamially manage physial assets under random demand and evolution of spot and forward ommodity
pries, and show on a numerial example how the use of reursive utilities an help strike a trade-o
between nal and intermediate wealth risk management and assess the synergy between the physial
assets omposing a ommodity portfolio.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In setion 2, we dene the time-onsisteny of optimal
strategies and ompare two objetives with respet to the issues of time-onsisteny, and risk/substitution
preferenes. In setion 3, we present the retailer's portfolio management problem and provide a priing
formula and bid/ask pries for physial ommodity assets. Setion 4 presents a numerial illustration of
the main ndings. Setion 5 ontains onluding omments.
1
Note that our framework redues to the one of Chen et al.(2004) when substitution preferenes are ignored and when CARA
utility funtions are used
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2 A omparison of dynami risk objetives
The objetive of this setion is to present two examples dynami risk preferenes and assess their time-
onsisteny properties, whih we view as an original ontribution of the paper.
2.1 Stati risk measures
In the ase of one period settings, a number of stati risk measures have been dened to express preferenes
of risk averse agents (see e.g., Artzner et al. (2000) and Frittelli et al. (2002)). Mathematially, a (stati)
risk measure is a funtion, here denoted , assoiating to a ontingent laim X a real number (X). (X)
represents the prie that it is aeptable to pay in order to purhaseX and  ( X) represents the apital
that must be provisioned in order to make a short position in X aeptable.
2.2 Risk measure assoiated to a stream of ash ows
2.2.1 Possible riteria for ash ow streams assessment
Dened on a ltered probability spae (
;F ;P; (F
t
)), the disrete-time stohasti proessG = (G
i
)
i=1;:::;T
,
represents a sequene of random ash ows ourring at times (
i
)
i=1;:::;T
. G is the set of all F

i
-adapted
ash ow proesses from i = 1 to i = T . We hoose F

1
= f;;
g (G
1
is deterministi), and F

T
= F , so
that full information is revealed at date 
T
.
A dynami value measure V = (V
i
)
i=1;:::;T
onsists of mappings V
i
: G  
 ! R that assoiate to eah
ash ow proess G 2 G and to eah ! 2 
 a real number V
i
(G;!). The resulting stohasti proess
(V
i
) is F

i
-adapted. Finanially, it represents the value of the sequene of ash ows (G
k
)
k=1;:::;T
or the
apital requirement to over the liabilities ( G
k
)
k=1;:::;T
at date 
i
.
Let us now propose two ategories of dynami values measures for streams of ash ows:
1. The rst ategory onsists of extensions of stati riteria depending on the wealth aumulated
between date 
i
and date 
T
:
W
i;T
:=
T
X
=i
G

V
i
(G;!) = (W
i;T
jF

i
) (1)
In the above equation,  is a one-step risk measure and the notation (:jF

i
) refers to onditioning
on the information available at date 
i
.
4
2. A seond ategory of riteria (proposed by Epstein et al. (1989) and Wang (2000)) are reursively
onstruted from the end of the time period by dening:
V
T
(G;!) = G
T
V
i
(G;!) = W (G
i
; (V
i+1
jF

i
)) 8i  T   1 (2)
In the above equation,  is a one-step ertainty equivalent
2
and the mapping W : R
2
! R is alled
an aggregator. In this framework, the date 
i
value is assessed reursively by aggregation of the
urrent ash ow G
i
and ertainty equivalent of V
i+1
seen from date 
i
. An important observation
is that the proess (V
i
) is F

i
-adapted.
2.3 Time onsisteny
Time-onsisteny is a property whih guarantees that preferenes implied by a dynami value measure do
not onit over time.
2.3.1 Examples of time-inonsisteny
Consider the two ash ow streams A and B, where all transition probabilities are supposed to equal 0:5:
 
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 
 
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B
Let us evaluate stream A using the dynami value measure (1) with (X) = u
 1
(E [u(X)℄), u(x) = ln(x):
V
2
(A; u) = exp(E(ln(W
A
2;3
ju))) = exp(0:5(ln(8) + ln(2))) = 4; V
2
(A; d) = exp(E(ln(W
A
2;3
jd))) =
p
6
2
We adopt Wang's denition of the ertainty equivalent, i.e., a stati measure  verifying the monotoniity property (whih
insures that if a random variable X is larger than Y in every state of the world, then (X)  (Y )) and redued to the identity
on the spae of onstant random variables.
5
V1
(A) = exp(E(ln(W
1;3
))) = exp(0:25(ln(11) + ln(5) + ln(9) + ln(4))) = (55 36)
1
4
Now evaluate stream B:
V
2
(B; u) = exp(E(ln(W
B
2;3
ju))) = exp(0:5(ln(6) + ln(3))) =
p
18; V
2
(B; d) = exp(E(ln(W
B
2;3
jd))) =
p
8
V
1
(B) = exp(E(ln(W
B
1;3
))) = exp(0:25(ln(9) + ln(6) + ln(7) + ln(5))) = (54 35)
1
4
We thus have simultaneously the following inequalities:
V
2
(A; u) < V
2
(B; u); V
2
(A; d) < V
2
(B; d); V
1
(A) > V
1
(B)
As a result, the dynami value measure V dened in (1) qualies B as preferable to A in all states of the
world at time 2 and A preferable to B at time 1, hene its time inonsisteny.
Time onsisteny does not hold either if  is a mean-variane instead of an expeted utility riterion
in equation (1). To see this, onsider the two following ash ow streams A (left) and B (right), with
transition probabilities being written on top of eah ar:
 
 
 
 
 

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







H
H
H
H
H
0
0 (state u)
0 (state d)
1 (state uu)
0 (state ud)
0
1
2
1
2
3
4
1
4
A
 
 
 
 
 
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0 (state u)
0 (state d)
0.5
0
1
2
1
2
B
Let us evaluate stream A using the dynami value measure (1) with (X) = E(X)   V ar(X):
V
2
(A; u) = E(W
A
2;3
ju))  V ar(W
A
2;3
ju)) =
3
4
  (
3
4
 
9
16
) =
9
16
V
2
(A; d) = E(W
A
2;3
jd))  V ar(W
A
2;3
jd)) = 0
V
1
(A) = E(W
A
1;3
))  V ar(W
A
1;3
)) =
1
2

3
4
  (
3
8
 
9
64
) =
9
64
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Now evaluate stream B:
V
2
(B; u) = E(W
B
2;3
ju))  V ar(W
B
2;3
ju)) =
1
2
V
2
(B; d) = E(W
B
2;3
jd))  V ar(W
B
2;3
jd)) = 0
V
1
(B) = E(W
B
1;3
))  V ar(W
B
1;3
)) =
1
2

1
2
  (
1
2

1
4
 
1
16
) =
3
16
=
12
64
We thus have simultaneously the following inequalities:
V
2
(A; u) > V
2
(B; u);V
2
(A; d)  V
2
(B; d);V
1
(A) < V
1
(B)
2.3.2 Denition of time onsisteny and omparison of the two riteria
We assume that the ash ows depend on deisions that are made at eah date 
i
, using the information
available at this date. Deision at date 
i
is the result of the optimization of a dynami value measure of
the type desribed above. This optimization not only yields the rst deision at that date, but a whole
deision planning for all subsequent stages. The question we pose in this setion is the following: are
optimal plannings onsistent over time?
Let us dene the problem formally: onsider a ash ow sequene (G
i
)
1iT
, ourring at dates (
i
)
i1
,
depending on deisions (q
i
)
1iT
and on a multi-dimensional random proess (
i
)
1iT
: G
i
:= f(q
i
; 
i
).
(
i
) is assumed to be of the type 
i+1
= g(
i
; 
i+1
) for some reasonably behaved funtion g, and a white
noise vetor proess (
i
).
We introdue the state variables x
i
on whih depend deisions at time 
i
and denote A(x
i
) the set of
admissible strategies (q
k
)
ikT
at time 
i
. We suppose that, after deision q
i
is made at time 
i
, the state
x
i
leads to x
i+1
= h(x
i
; q
i
; 
i+1
; 
i+1
), where h is a deterministi funtion and (
i
) a white noise vetor
proess possibly orrelated with (
i
). We denote (F

i
) the ltration generated by the proesses (
i
; 
i
);
(q
i
) is supposed to be an (F

i
)-adapted proess.
Lastly, we onsider the following optimization problem, related to a dynami value measure V :
J
i
(x
i
) := Max
(q
k
)
kt
2A(x
i
)
V
i
(G) (3)
We denote (q
i
k
(x
i
))
ki
the resulting (F

i
)-adapted optimal strategy deided at date 
i
3
. The question of
onsisteny of optimal strategies an be formulated in the following way:
Is q
i
i+1
(x
i
; 
i+1
; 
i+1
) equal to (q
(i+1)
i+1
(x
i+1
)), where x
i+1
= h(x
i
; q
i
(x
i
); 
i+1
; 
i+1
)?
3
We suppose throughout this setion that all enountered optimization problems have a unique solution
7
We now turn to the time onsisteny of optimal strategies derived from the two dynami value measures
dened above.
- First, let us onsider the nal wealth objetive dened in equation (1) with (X) = u
 1
(E [u(X)℄),i.e,
V
i
(G;!) = u
 1
(E(u(G
i
+G
i+1
+ :::+G
T
)jF

i
)))
4
:
J
i
(x
i
) : = Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A(x
i
)
V
i
(G)
= u
 1

Max
q
i
Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
E

i
(E

i+1
(u(G
t
+G
i+1
+ :::+G
T
)))

= u
 1

Max
q
i
E

i
( Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
2A(x
i+1
)
E

i+1
(u(G
i
+G
i+1
+ :::+G
T
)))

The date 
i+1
implied problem Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
E

i+1
(u(G
i
+G
i+1
+ :::+G
T
))) diers from the one derived from
the dynami value measure (V
i
), i.e., Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
V
i+1
= E

i+1
(u(G
i+1
+G
i+2
+ ::: +G
T
)). As a result, the
optimal strategy deided at time i diers from the optimal strategy exhibited at time i+ 1.
Time inonsisteny remains if we use a mean-variane objetive instead of an expeted utility. In order
to further investigate this issue, let us onsider a sequene of three ash ows (G
1
; G
2
; G
3
), depending on
the (F

i
)-adapted proess (

i
)
i=1;2;3
and F

i
-measurable deisions (q
i
)
i=1;2;3
, and let us deompose the
variane of the sum of these ash ows. As usual, we denote V ar

i
(X) := V ar(X jF

i
).
V ar

1
(G
1
+G
2
+G
3
) = V ar

1
(G
2
+G
3
) = E

1
[(G
2
+G
3
)
2
℄  [E

1
(G
2
+G
3
)℄
2
= E

1
[E

2
((G
2
+G
3
)
2
)℄  [E

1
(E

2
(G
2
+G
3
))℄
2
= E

1
[E

2
((G
2
+G
3
)
2
)℄  E

1
([E

2
(G
2
+G
3
)℄
2
) + E

1
([E

2
(G
2
+G
3
)℄
2
)  [E

1
(E

2
(G
2
+G
3
))℄
2
= E

1
[V ar

2
(G
2
+G
3
)℄ + V ar

1
(E

2
(G
2
+G
3
)) = E

1
[V ar

2
(G
3
)℄ + V ar

1
(G
2
+ E

2
(G
3
))
The last equality illuminates why total variane is time inonsistent: the F

1
-measurable term V ar

1
(G
2
+
E

2
(G
3
)) is ontrolled by both deisions q
1
and q
2
, in ontrast to the term G
1
, whih depends only on the
deision q
1
. This fat ompromises the existene of any dynami programming equation linking optimal
strategies at dates 
1
and 
2
:
J
1
(x
1
) : = Max
(q
k
)
k=1;2;3
2A(x
1
)
fE

1
(G
1
+G
2
+G
3
)  V ar

1
(G
1
+G
2
+G
3
)g
= Max
(q
k
)
k=1;2;3
fG
1
(q
1
)  V ar

1
(G
2
+ E

2
(G
3
)) + E

1
(E

2
(G
2
+G
3
)  V ar

2
(G
3
))g
6= Max
q
1

G
1
(q
1
)  V ar

1
(G
2
+ E

2
(G
3
)) + E

1
( Max
(q
k
)
k=2;3
2A(x
2
)
E

2
(G
2
+G
3
)  V ar

2
(G
3
))

4
From now on, we will denote E(X jF

i
) = E

i
(X)
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- We now turn to the dynami value measures desribed in equation (2).
As a rst observation, let us onsider the ase of a linear aggregatorW (x; y) = x+y. The date 
i
objetive
derived from the value measure V
i
dened by equation (2) is then:
J
i
(x
i
) : = Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A(x
i
)
V
i
(G)
= Max
(q
k
)
ki
fG
i
(q
i
) + 

i
(V
i+1
)g
= Max
q
i

G
i
(q
i
) + Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
2A(x
i+1
)


i
(V
i+1
)

The question at this stage is to know whether permuting the operatorsMax and operator  is legitimate
in the last equality, i.e., if the following property holds:
Max
(q
k
)
ki+1


i
(V
i+1
)
?
= 

i
( Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
V
i+1
) (4)
If the permutation is valid, then the optimal strategies will be time-onsistent sine the date 
i+1
implied
problem Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
V
i+1
will oinide with the optimization problem at stage i+1; otherwise, they will not.
Let us try the aggregatorW (x; y) = 
 1
((x)+(y)) and ertainty equivalent (X) = u
 1
(E [u(X)℄),
where u and  are inreasing funtions and  is a positive disounting fator
5
:
J
i
(x
i
) : = Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A(x
i
)
V
i
(G) = Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A(x
i
)

 1
((G
i
(q
i
) + (

i
(V
i+1
)))
= 
 1

Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A(x
i
)
f(G
i
(q
i
)) + (

i
(V
i+1
))g

= 
 1

Max
q
i

(G
i
(q
i
)) + ( Max
(q
k
)
ki+1


i
(V
i+1
))

The inversion between operators Max and  in the last equality is permitted as
Max
(q
k
)
ki+1


i
(V
i+1
) = Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
u
 1
(E

i
(u(V
i+1
))) = u
 1

E

i
( Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
2A(x
i+1
)
u(V
i+1
))

= u
 1

E

i
(u( Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
2A(x
i+1
)
V
i+1
))

= 

i
( Max
(q
k
)
ki+1
2A(x
i+1
)
V
i+1
)
We an now present a general suÆient ondition of time onsisteny for optimal strategies:
Property 2.1: If there exist non dereasing funtions a b, , and d and positive numbers 
t
suh that
V
i
(G) = a hfb(G
i
(q
i
)) + 
i
 [E
i
(d (V
i+1
(G))℄gi (5)
then the dynami value measure (V
i
) leads to time-onsistent optimal strategies.
For the reursive value proess dened by utility funtions  and u, equation (5) holds with a = 
 1
,
5
This partiular hoie for the aggregator and the ertainty equivalent was rst suggested by Epstein and Zin (1989) and
later on extended by Wang (2000) to inorporate ambiguity aversion
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b = ,  = Æu
 1
, and d = u. In the ase of lassial expetation maximization (risk-neutrality), equation
(5) holds with a = b =  = d = Id.
2.4 Risk and substitution
We have mentioned earlier that the problem of dynami optimization under unertainty involves two
dimensions, one with respet to the distribution of ash ows aross states of nature, the other over on-
seutive time periods. The rst dimension has an eet on the nal wealth distribution while the seond
one impats the likelihood of bankrupty within the time period.
Dynami value measures dened in equations (1) are not appropriate to apture the risk attahed to in-
termediate ash ows sine they are based on nal wealth. By ontrast, reursive dynami value measures
allows one to disentangle randomness and time omponents, via the ertainty equivalent  and the ag-
gregator W (respetively aounting for the risk aversion and the substitution preferenes of the deision
maker). For instane, in the ase of reursive dynami value measures based on utility funtions, the
onavity of the funtions u and  leads to the smoothing of ash ows distributions in both dimensions
and in turn to a joint ontrol of the nal wealth risk and bankrupty risk.
Remark: The hoie u =  in reursive value measures derived from utility funtions u and  leads to the
lassial objetive: V
i
(G) = u
 1
(E

i
(
P
T
k=i


k
 
i
u(G
k
))), whih has been widely used in onsumption
and portfolio hoie problems in nane (e.g., onsumption-based CAPM). Of ourse, this objetive is
time onsistent and aptures both risk aversion and substitution; its drawbak is that it does not oer
as muh exibility as a more general reursive value measure sine risk aversion and substitution are
represented by the same funtion u.
As a onlusion of this setion, we an state that reursive dynami value measures with utility type
aggregator and ertainty equivalent are satisfatory in regard to time onsisteny of optimal strategies
and inter-temporal risk management.
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3 The retailer's portfolio problem
3.1 The model
We adopt a disrete time setting, with a nite horizon. The deision periods are denoted (p
i
), i = 1; :::; T
(typially months or quarters). The dates (
i
) are dening the periods (p
i
).
-
date 1 date 2
...
date T

1

2

T
period 1 period 2
...
period T
We assume from now on that the retailer's portfolio is omposed of one sale ontrat and one storage
reservoir. In addition, the ommodity is supposed to be traded, stored, and onsumed in the same
loation (in order to avoid transmission osts and onstraints). The problem an be represented in a
stylized diagram:
-
6
6
?
?
retailer
storage
market
lient
L
max
is the maximal level of storage, L
min
is the minimal level of storage (at any date), L
init
is the
initial storage level, L
end
is the minimal storage level at the end of the horizon. L
i
represents the storage
level at the end of period p
i
. Q
inj
i
denotes maximal injetion in period p
i
, Q
draw
i
maximal withdrawal; we
suppose there are no injetion/withdrawal osts nor holding ost. d
i
denotes the lient's random demand
in period p
i
, K
s
i
is the xed selling prie of the ommodity for period i.
Only forward ontrats are onsidered; ash ows due to forward ontrating are settled at maturity
of the ontrat and ounterparty risk ignored. We denote by F (i; j) the forward prie of the ommodity
quoted during p
i
for delivery in period p
j
6
(j  i) and S
i
the spot prie of the ommodity, where
S
i
:= F (i; i).
Remarks:
6
Here, F (i; j) an be onsidered as the average prie over all the quotation dates belonging to period p
i
of all forward
ontrats for delivery in period p
j
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1. In our model, trading is only authorized at deision dates
2. Even in the ase of illiquid markets, the retailer is assumed to be a prie-taker, meaning that her
trading deisions will have no impat on market pries
Storage deision variables orresponding to period p
i
are subjet to the following onstraints:
0  q
inj
i
 Q
inj
i
; 0  q
draw
i
 Q
draw
i
i  1 (6)
L
0
:= L
init
; L
i+1
= L
i
+ q
inj
i
  q
draw
i
0  i  T (7)
L
min
 L
i
 L
max
8i = 1; :::; T ; L
T
 L
end
(8)
n(i; j) denotes the net number of forward ontrats bought during period p
i
for delivery in period p
j
(j  i), the ase i = j being a spot transation. N(i; j) represents the total forward position at the end
of period p
i
for delivery in period p
j
and satises the onditions:
N(0; j) := 0 8j  1; N(i; j) = N(i  1; j) + n(i; j) 8 1  i  j (9)
We model the sequene of events and deisions in the following way: during period p
i
, the retailer disovers
the lient's demand and deides on date 
i
whih quantities n(i; j) to buy on the spot and forward market
and q
inj
i
or q
draw
i
to injet in or withdraw from storage, respeting the physial balane of ommodity
ows during period p
i
i.e.,
N(i; i) + q
draw
i
  q
inj
i
= d
i
8 1  i  T (10)
Equation (10) expresses that market and storage are the two ways to serve demand at period p
i
.
We dene the disrete set of states of nature 
. Eah ! 2 
 represents a realization of the proess

i
= (d
i
; F (i; j)
ji
), i = 1:::T . We denote by (F

i
) the ltration generated by (
i
). Throughout the
paper, we assume the absene of arbitrage opportunities in the ommodity spot and forward markets. On
(
;F ;F

i
), we dene a risk-neutral probability measure P, under whih forward pries are martingales
7
.
We dene the set A of admissible strategies as:
A :=
n
(q
i
)
i1
= (q
draw
i
; q
inj
i
; n(i; j)
ji
)
i1
F

i
 measurable and verifying onstraints (6) to (10)
o
7
We hoose here to work under a risk-neutral probability measure P to rule out a speulative use of the spot and forward
markets; indeed, if forward pries were not martingales under P, the trading deisions implied by our model ould be inuened
by possible spreads between forward pries and P-expeted values of spot pries, a feature whih is not relevant in the retailer's
ontext
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3.2 Deomposition results in two partiular ases
In this setion, it is assumed that there are neither onstraints nor osts assoiated to trading in the
forward market. The risk-free interest rate r is supposed onstant. The goal here is to present two ases
where the priing issues and management of the portfolio are partiularly simple:
- the rst ase is the one of a liquid market and deterministi demand
- the seond ase inludes unertain demand but assumes risk-neutrality of the retailer, hene the use of
a riterion of expeted prot maximization
In both ases, a full deomposition of the portfolio value and management is possible.
The total ash ow during period p
i
is denoted as G
i
and may be written as:
G
i
= d
i
K
s
i
 
T
X
j=i
e
 r(
j
 
i
)
F (i; j)n(i; j) (11)
Remark: Cash ows due to forward trading are in this paper registered at transation date and disounted
from delivery date at the risk free interest rate r. We adopt this unusual rule beause we want ash
ows at dates 
i
to depend only on date 
i
deisions and not on previous ones
8
, as would be the ase
if ash ows from forward transation had been registered at delivery date. Sine interest rates are
onsidered deterministi, this representation has no onsequenes on the nal wealth but may have some
on intermediate wealths
9
.
Assuming liquid spot markets, the oupling onstraint (10) an be treated as an impliit one and we fae
a fully deomposable problem, with onstraints only on individual assets.
Deriving from (9) and (10) the volume n(i; i) of spot transations, equation (11) beomes:
G
i
= d
i
K
s
i
  n(i; i)S
i
 
T
X
j=i+1
e
 r(
j
 
i
)
n(i; j)F (i; j)
= q
draw
i
S
i
  q
inj
i
S
i
+ d
i
(K
s
i
  S
i
) +N(i  1; i)S
i
 
T
X
j=i+1
e
 r(
j
 
i
)
n(i; j)F (i; j)
In this form, G
i
appears like the sum of three omponents:
1. q
draw
i
S
i
  q
inj
i
S
i
= period p
i
payo from the storage faility. Storage deisions taken over time are
inter-dependent due to the apaity onstraints expressed in equation (6)
2. d
i
(K
s
i
 S
i
) = period p
i
payo from the sale ontrat devoided of any optionality, whih is in fat a
8
in aordane with the setting dened in setion 2.3.2
9
we thus assume here that the retailer provisions in advane all the future gains or liabilities at the signature of a forward
ontrat
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strip of swaps exhanging the sale ontrat prie K
s
i
for the spot prie S
i
. The volume involved at
period p
i
is either xed (deterministi demand) or random (unknown demand)
3. N(i  1; i)S
i
 
P
T
j=i+1
e
 r(
j
 
i
)
n(i; j)F (i; j) = period p
i
ash ow from forward ontrats
Under this form, the portfolio appears as a ombination of various options written on the ommodity
spot prie while the forward market appears as a way to hedge the spot prie risk. The above splitting
of ash ows suggests a deomposition of the portfolio's value. In fat, the latter will only be possible in
two partiular ases:
 Portfolio deomposition in a omplete market setting: here, we assume that the demand proess (d
i
)
is deterministi (e.g., the ontrat sets a xed volume to be delivered in all future periods). Then,
the arbitrage prie of the portfolio is the sum of maximal expeted ash ows under the (unique)
risk-neutral probability measure; this value is the sum of the arbitrage pries of storage and sale
ontrat. In this framework, the obvious strategy for the portfolio manager onsists in optimizing
independently the storage faility against the spot market under the risk-neutral measure, and
hedging spot prie risk using the forward market.
 Portfolio deomposition for a risk-neutral retailer in a liquid market: we assume here that the retailer
faes both demand and prie risks but is risk-neutral, i.e.,she only tries to maximize her expeted
prot. Under the assumption that the physial measure is a risk-neutral measure, the optimal
strategy for the risk-neutral retailer onsists again in optimizing independently the storage faility
against the spot market and doing no trade in the forward market. Moreover, under deterministi
demand, the optimum of the risk-neutral retailer's objetive orresponds to the arbitrage prie of
the portfolio.
3.3 The retailer problem in an inomplete/illiquid market
Illiquidity is modeled by deterministi volume onstraints on spot and forward trading, of the form:
n
b
(i; i+ )  n
max
b
(i; ); n
s
(i; i+ )  n
max
s
(i; ) (12)
where n
b
(i; j) and n
s
(i; j) stand for the number of bought and sold forward ontrats during period p
i
for delivery in period p
j
(with n(i; j) = n
b
(i; j)  n
s
(i; j)).
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We dene the set of admissible strategies from state x
i
:
A(x
i
) :=
n
(q
k
)
ki
= (q
draw
k
; q
inj
k
; n(k; j)
jk
)
ki
F
k
 measurable verifying admissibility onstraints
o
(13)
and the analogous set of illiquid market admissible strategies A
liq
(x
i
). The restritions of the previous
deision sets to date t, dening the admissibility sets for deisions q
t
only, will be denoted by A
t
(x
t
) and
A
liq
t
(x
t
).
We an now formulate the retailer's optimization problem as:
J
i
(x
i
) := Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A
liq
(x
i
)
V
i
(G) (14)
where the state x
i
is dened by x
i
= (L
i
; N(i; :); 
i
), G by (11) and V
i
(G) by the reursive equation (2),
with aggregator W and ertainty equivalent  derived from onave inreasing funtions  and u and
positive disount fators (
i
):
W (x; y) = 
 1
((x) + 
i
(y)); (X) = u
 1
(E [u(X)℄)
We denote suh a dynami value measure as V
;u
t
(G).
The optimal value J
i
(x
i
) satises the dynami programming equation:
J
i
(x
i
) = 
 1
( Max
q
i
2A
liq
i
(x
i
)

(G
i
(q
i
)) + 
i
 Æ u
 1
(E
i
(u(J
i+1
(x
i+1
))))
	
) (15)
where the state x
i+1
is given by the transition equation x
i+1
= (L
i
+q
inj
i
 q
draw
i
; N(i; :)+n(i; :); g(
i
; 
i+1
)).
The existene of equation (15) guarantees the time onsisteny of optimal strategies, as shown in the
previous setion.
3.4 A onavity property for J
i
Proposition 3.4.1:
Choosing CARA type utilities (x) =  e
 x
and u(x) =  e
 x
suh that 0 <   , for all dates t, and all
states x
t
suh that A
liq
t
(x
t
) 6= ;, the maximization problem Max
q
t
2A
liq
t
(x
t
)

(G
t
(q
t
)) + 
t
 Æ u
 1
(E
t
(u(J
t+1
(x
t+1
))))
	
is onave with respet to deisions q
t
. Moreover, the deision set A
liq
t
(x
t
) is onvex. The result also holds
for  = Id and u of CARA type.
The proof is available from the authors on request.
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3.5 J
i
as the arbitrage prie of the portfolio in omplete markets
In this setion, we show that, in omplete markets, J
t
is the arbitrage prie of the portfolio under the
two onditons: (x) = x (no preferene for smooth versus irregular ash ows in time dimension) and

i
= e
 r(
i+1
 
i
)
(one period disount fator). These two assumptions will hold throughout setion 3.5.
Property 3.5.1:
J
i
(x
i
) = Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A
liq
(x
i
)
V
Id;u
i
(G) is never greater than the risk-neutral objetive J
rn
i
(x
i
) = Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A
liq
(x
i
)
V
Id;Id
i
(G)
Proof : The onavity of u implies that for all random variables X :
u
 1
(E [u(X)℄)  E(X) (16)
It results, by a simple reursion, that:
8G 2 G; 8i 2 T ; V
Id;u
i
(G) = G
i
+ 
i
u
 1
(E

i
(u(V
Id;u
t+1
)))  G
t
+ 
i
E

i
(V
Id;Id
i+1
) = V
Id;Id
i
(G)
and the property holds. 
Property 3.5.2: When onditional values V
k+1
omputed at stages k (k = i; ::; T  1) are non stohasti,
then V
Id;u
i
is the sum of disounted ash ows from stage i to stage T
Proof : In this ase, u
 1
(E

i
(u(V
Id;u
k+1
))) = V
Id;u
k+1
for all k = i; :::; T   1, and, therefore, V
Id;u
i
(G) =
G
i
+ 
i
V
Id;u
i+1
=
P
T
k=i
e
 r(
k
 
i
)
G
k
, by a simple reursion.
The onsequene is that, in a omplete market setting (i.e., deterministi demand and no liquidity on-
straints), J
i
is at least equal to the arbitrage prie of the portfolio.
Property 3.5.3: In a situation of market ompleteness, J
i
(x
i
) is equal to the arbitrage prie of the
portfolio J
ap
i
(x
i
) = Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A(x
i
)
E
Q

i
(
P
T
k=i
e
 r(
k
 
i
)
G
k
), where Q is the (unique) risk-neutral measure
Proof : This property is derived from the following observations:
- J
i
(x
i
)  Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A(x
i
)
V
Id;Id
i
(G), as exhibited in property 3.5.1
- Max
(q
k
)
ki
2A(x
i
)
V
Id;Id
i
(G) = J
ap
i
(x
i
), beause the optimal value of the risk-neutral retailer's portfolio is
equal to its arbitrage prie.
- J
i
(x
i
)  J
ap
i
(x
i
), as shown in property 3.5.2.
Property 3.5.4: If markets are omplete and u stritly onave, then the risk of the optimal strat-
egy (q

k
)
ki
is null.
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Proof : The equality between J
i
(x
i
) and J
rn
i
(x
i
) implies an equality in equation (16) for eah X = V
i+1
,
and, beause the fontion u is strily onave, the equality is possible only if unertainty on all V
t
is null.
Consequently, we obtain the satisfatory property that the optimization programme also provides a hedg-
ing strategy.
To onlude this paragraph, we an note that the question of estimating the ask and bid pries of a
physial asset or nanial ontrat in inomplete markets remains to be solved. As often done in the
literature , we dene the ask (bid) prie as the dierene of the values of J
i
, with and without the bought
(sold) asset. Under this denition, the bid and ask pries of an asset depend not only on the risk aversion
of the manager but also on her initial portfolio, a lassial property in a situation of inompleteness.
3.6 A model for the evolution of the forward urve and demand
We assume a lassial one-fator evolution model for the market forward urve F (i; j):
F (i; j) = F (i  1; j)M
i;j
exp(e
 k
i
(
j
 
i
)
X
i
) 8j  i8i  2 (17)
where (X
i
)
i2
is a disrete-time stohasti proess omposed of independent variables with lawN(0; (
X
i
)
2
),
(k
i
) are positive parameters, and (M
i;j
)
ji
are positive onstants ensuring that F (i; j)
ij
are martingale
proesses. In this model, only one type of shok is allowed for the forward urve, namely translations,
with an amplitude vanishing with time to delivery.
Regarding the demand proess (d
i
)
i2
, we assume that it is driven by a disrete-time stohasti pro-
ess (Y
i
) (typially the temperature), omposed of independent variables with law N(0; (
Y
i
)
2
) positively
orrelated with the prie proess with orrelation oeÆients (
i
):
d
i
= max(f
i
;

d
i
+ Y
i
) (18)
where (f
i
) are positive oors ensuring that the demand proess is positive, and (

d
i
) are the average
demands at eah period.
As a onlusion, to simulate the joint evolution of forward urve and demand at periods (p
i
), we only
need to jointly simulate the random variables (X
i
) and (Y
i
) for i = 1; :::; T and then use formulas (17)
and (18).
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4 Numerial results
4.1 The event tree
We use here a standard stohasti programming tehnique to solve the problem. The set of realizations of
the demand and the forward urve is represented on an event tree with nodes n 2 N , the deisions q(t; !)
are indexed on the nodes of the tree, and the time-1 objetive is maximized numerially with respet to
all deisions (q
n
)
n2N
using a large sale non linear solver.
To build the event tree, we use a two-dimensional lattie (see Webber (1997)), repliating exatly the rst
two moments of the proess (X;Y ) at eah time step.
The four vertexes of the unit square rst provide the equiprobable joint realizations of a vetor
~
Z = (
~
X;
~
Y )
of two unorrelated zero mean unit variane random variables:
-
6
Æ
Æ
Æ
Æ
(1; 1)
(1; 1)
( 1; 1)
( 1; 1)
Figure 1: Senarios for two unorrelated random variables
The extension to two orrelated variables is straightforward: onsidering a vetor of two unorre-
lated unit variane variables
~
Z = (
~
X;
~
Y ), the vetor of random variables Z = (X;Y ) = A
~
Z with
A =
0
B
B


x
0

y
p
1  
2

y
1
C
C
A
have zero mean and ovariane matrix  =
0
B
B

(
x
)
2

x

y

x

y
(
y
)
2
1
C
C
A
.
Therefore, we proeed in the following way to build the event tree on the prie/demand proess:
- rst, using the matrix M =
0
B
B

1 1  1  1
1  1 1  1
1
C
C
A
, whose olumns represent the four joint realiza-
tions of a vetor (
~
X;
~
Y ) of two unorrelated zero mean, unit variane variables, we form the 2 4 matrix
N = AM , whose olumns are the realizations of the vetor (X
1
; Y
1
), representing the prie/demand nodes
at time 1
- then, we attah to eah node of period 1 the son nodes given by the matrix N = AM , and so on, until
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(a) Realizations of the forward urve (e/MWh) (b) Realizations of demand (TWh)
() Two-dimensional representation of the prie and
demand proesses (X;Y ) at eah time step: the re-
alizations of the prie proess X an be read on the
x-axis
Figure 2: Event tree
the last period
- nally, we apply formulas (17) and (18) to get the forward urve and the demand at eah node, the term
M
i;j
being determined by the martingale ondition at node n:
F
n
(i  1; j) = E
n
(F
m
(i; j)) =
X
m2S(n)
1
4
F
m
(i; j) (19)
where S(n) is the set of sons of node n, whih gives:
M
i;j
=
1
P
m2S(n)
1
4
exp(e
 k
i
(
j
 
i
)
X
m
i
)
(20)
It is important to point out here that the term M depends only on i and j and not of node n beause
the variables (X
i
; Y
i
) are independent of (X
i 1
; Y
i 1
), hene the sets fX
m
i
; m 2 S(n)g are the same for
every node n of date 
i 1
.
We obtain 4
T 1
dierent senarios from period 1 to period T .
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4.2 The setting
We assume the following setting:
- the retailer is trading an energy produt, whose prie is expressed in e/MWh
- there are ve periods of one quarter eah: during the rst quarter, the retailer faes no demand and
replenishes her storage faility using the spot market in order to meet the unknown lient's demand in
the following year
- the storage has an initial level at 20 TWh, a maximal withdrawalinjetion/withdrawal per period of 10
TWh, a maximal (resp. minimal) storage level of 50 TWh (resp. 0), and a minimal end level of 20 TWh
- the forward prie dynamis are represented by the model desribed in equation (17) with parameters
k
i
= 2 years
 1
and volatility 
X
i
= 0:2 8i  2; the initial forward urve is supposed to be at at the level
20 e/MWh; in partiular, the initial spot prie equals 20 e/MWh
- the maximal allowed traded volume in the market dereases withtime-to-delivery: it equals 30 TWh for
ontrats delivering in the present quarter ("spot" transation), 10 TWh for ontrats delivering in the
next quarter, 5 TWh for ontrats delivering in two quarters, and 0 TWh for ontrats delivering in the
following periods
- the selling prie on the sale ontrat is 21 e/MWh (hene a margin of 5% with respet to the average
market forward prie); regarding the demand harateristis, we suppose that d
1
= 0, and 8i  2: 
Y
i
= 10
TWh,

d
i
= 20 TWh, f
i
=

d
i
3
, and 
i
= 0:5. The realizations of (X;Y ) at eah time step are represented
on gure (2()): we note that there are four dierent realizations for the demand proess and two only
for the prie proess
- we adopt CARA utility funtions u(x) =  e
 x
and (x) =  e
 x
to represent risk aversion and
substitution preferenes, with varying risk aversion and substitution parameters  and ; interest rates
are set to 0.
Figures (2(a)) and (2(b)) show the forward urve and demand senarios. The mean-reverting nature of
the spot prie is visible.
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4.3 Eet of optimal strategies on the nal and minimal wealths
Figure (3(a)) shows the mean variane trade-o in the nal wealth obtained when risk aversion varies and
the funtion  remains equal to identity. When the risk is dened as the Conditional Value at Risk
10
on
the nal wealth W
T
11
:
CV aR
q
(W ) = E( W
T
j  W
T
> V aR
q
(W )) (21)
the expeted mean is an inreasing funtion of risk, as shown in gure (3(a)). For example, a derease of
the 0.5% (resp. 5%) CVaR on nal wealth from 611 (resp. 505) to 371 (resp. 291) Me implies a derease
of the expeted nal wealth from 67 to 15 Me. Figure (3(b)) represents the trade-o between the risks
of the nal wealth and temporal minimal wealth
12
. Figure (3(b)) shows that it is possible to exhange
bankrupty risk for nal wealth risk by dereasing the ratio of parameter  to parameter . For example,
to ut the 0.5% (resp. 5%) CVaR on temporal minimal wealth from 1059 to 545 (resp. 473) Me, one
has to aept a rise of the 0.5% (resp. 5%) CVaR on nal wealth from 365 (resp. 296) to 516 (resp. 458)
Me. However, the exhange of bankrupty risk for nal wealth risk has limits: Figure (3(b)) shows in
partiular that it is not possible to bring down the 0.5% (resp. 5%) CVaR on temporal minimal wealth
below a ertain threshold, orresponding to the pair ( = 0:1;  = 0:001) (resp. ( = 0:01;  = 0:0005)).
Figures (4(a)) shows the umulative funtion of the nal wealth over the 256 tree senarios used in
the optimization proedure under dierent values of risk aversion. In gure (4(a)), we observe that a
risk aversion of 0:02 allows to signiantly redue the left tail up to 5% of the distribution obtained
under a risk-neutral strategy. The ost of a higher risk aversion is that the main part of the nal wealth
distribution (to the right of the 10% quantile) is signiantly moved upright. Figure (4(b)) shows the
distribution of the minimal wealth over time: we see that a more onave funtion  signiantly redues
the likelihood of a very negative minimal temporal wealth, whih is a onsequene of the smoothing
of ash ows in the time dimension. However, as shown by gure (4(a)), if the ratio


beomes too
high (e.g.( = 0:01;  = 0:0005)), the nal wealth distribution exhibits a large left tail. If the portfolio
manager seeks to strike a balane between nal wealth and bankrupty risk management, he may hoose
( = 0:1;  = 0:001) or ( = 0:01;  = 0:0001). Figure (5) represents the intermediate wealths obtained
10
V aR
q
(W ) is the well-known Value-at-Risk assoiated to quantile q
11
the wealth W
i
at the end of period p
i
is dened as the umulative sum of ash ows from period p
1
to period p
i
12
Temporal minimal wealth is dened as min
i2f1;2;3;4;5g
W
i
; the temporal minimal wealth distribution is thus diretly linked
to bankrupty risk
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(a) Expeted nal wealth in terms of CVaR (in Me); eah urve
orresponds to a dierent CVaR quantile and is onstruted
with  taking the values f0; 0:001; 0:005; 0:01; 0:02g
(b) CVaR of the temporal minimal wealth in terms of CVaR of
the nal wealth (in Me); eah urve orresponds to a dierent
CVaR quantile and is onstruted with (; ) taking the values
(0:1; 0); (0:05; 0:0001); (0:02; 0:0001); (0:01; 0:0001); (0:1; 0:001); (0:01; 0:005);
(0:01; 0:001); (0:001; 0:0001)
Figure 3: Trade-os between expeted wealth/nal wealth risk and nal wealth risk/bankrupty risk
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(a) Final wealth umulative funtion (in Me); the ase
 = 0 (resp.  = 0) orresponds to a funtion u (resp.
) equal to identity
(b) Temporal minimal wealth (in Me) umulative fun-
tion in inomplete markets; the ase  = 0 (resp.  = 0)
orresponds to a funtion u (resp. ) equal to identity
Figure 4: Final and temporal minimal wealth umulative funtions for dierent risk aversion and substitution
parameters
at the dierent nodes of the event tree for dierent ouples of (; ) and onrms the above onlusions:
hoosing ( = 0:01;  = 0:0005) allows one to ontrol the intermediate wealth risk but implies a great
dispersion of the nal wealth; onversely, hoosing ( = 0:02;  = 0) oers a very narrow range of nal
wealths but with a high bankrupty risk at the end of the seond period; the hoie ( = 0:01;  = 0:0001)
represents a trade-o between and nal and intermediate wealth risks.
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(a) Wealth prole in the ase (0,0) (b) Wealth prole in the ase (0.02,0)
() Wealth prole in the ase (0.01,0.0001) (d) Wealth prole in the ase (0.01,0.0005)
Figure 5: Cumulative wealths (in Me) in the dierent nodes of the event tree for dierent pairs (; )
4.4 Portfolio value
Figure (6(a)) represents the portfolio value dened in setion 3.5 for dierent risk aversion parameters.
The portfolio value is a dereasing funtion of the risk aversion parameter. The spread between the
risk-neutral and positive risk aversion values an be interpreted as a risk premium, whose value inreases
logially with the risk aversion parameter.
The value of the sale ontrat, obtained by setting the storage exibility to zero in the original portfolio
13
,
behaves similarly. The storage value, obtained by setting the lient's demand to zero in the retailer's
portfolio, does not depend on the risk aversion parameter: this is due to the fat that, under the liquidity
assumptions made in setion 4.2, the storage faility has a unique arbitrage value (here 55.26 Me) whih
an be seured by appropriate forward transations; in this ontext, the optimum J
1
of the storage
management problem redues to the storage arbitrage value, as explained in setion 3.4. The synergy
value whih is dened as the spread between the portfolio value, on the one hand, and the sum of the sale
13
Setting the storage exibility to zero may ause the problem to be infeasible in the ase of illiquid markets and non-
interruptible lients; estimating the sale ontrat value may thus require in some situations the introdution of artiial inter-
ruption/emergeny supply osts to relax the possibly too restritive volume onstraints; in our example, the lients' demand
ould be met in every senario only with the illiquid market
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(a) Deomposition of portfolio value for dierent risk aversion
parameters
(b) Synergy value in term of risk aversion parameter for dif-
ferent demand volatilities 
Figure 6: Deomposition of J
1
(x
1
) = Max
(q
k
)
k1
2A
liq
(x
1
)
V
Id;u
1
(G) (in Me) and synergy value for dierent risk
aversion parameters and dierent demand volatilities
ontrat and storage separate values
14
, on the other hand, is null for a risk-neutral retailer and inreases
with the risk aversion parameter, whih expresses the fat that the synergy between sale ontrat and
storage faility is in term of risk management rather than in term of expeted return.
Figure (6(b)) represents the synergy value in term of the risk aversion parameter under dierent demand
volatilities. It is observed that the synergy value inreases with demand volatility, whih means that the
storage faility's value-added in the retailer's portfolio inreases with the demand unertainty. Figure (7)
shows that the storage's value added beomes null in a ontext of high forward market liquidity, even in
the presene of volume unertainty: the synergy eet arises only under an illiquid forward market. In
addition, the portfolio value varies from  89 to 37 Me, depending on the forward market liquidity, whih
points out the importane of liquidity assumption for portfolio valuation.
14
the synergy value also equals the spread between the storage portfolio value dened in setion 3.5 and the storage arbitrage
value
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Figure 7: Portfolio and synergy values (in Me) for the dierent settings of forward market liquidity desribed
in table (1) (with  = 0:01 and demand volatility  = 10 TWh)
Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
low liquidity setting 30 10 5 0 0
medium liquidity setting 30 10 10 10 10
high liquidity setting 30 30 30 30 30
Table 1: Desription of the three liquidity settings: Q0 represents the maximal volume of "spot" transations,
Q1 the maximal volume for delivery in the next quarter, Q2 the maximal volume for delivery in the next
following quarter...
5 Conlusion
We have developed in this paper a tratable model to introdue time-onsisteny in managing a ommodity
portfolio. In this order, we assessed two dierent types of risk objetives: only the reursive dynami
value measure based on a utility-type aggregator and ertainty equivalent was found to be time-onsistent.
Moreover, this form of dynami value measure has the appealing feature of disentangling the omponents
of risk aross states of nature and temporal substitution and making them transparent to the deision
maker. These properties are illustrated on a numerial example. The use of the model signiantly
redues the left tail in the nal wealth distribution, and leads to a satisfatory trade-o between nal
wealth risk and expeted wealth when risk is represented by Conditional Value at Risk. Lastly, the model
26
allows one to dene an optimal strategy between dereasing the risk of the nal wealth and reduing the
likelihood of a bankrupty within the time horizon.
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